Setting the stage
In Rawls's Law of Peoples individuals from various countries meet to organize a contractual arrangement regulating their relations in a metaphor similar to the justly celebrated one for the citizens of the same nation from his Theory of Justice. There are differences though in the global gathering since the meeting is between representatives of each nation (people) rather than between all world individuals. And the outcome is different too, in two important respects: Rawls rejects the application of the global difference principle in favor of fairly limited aid to the "burdened peoples" that are hampered by poverty from achieving a "decent" society, and assumes that migration takes place only in response to egregious violation of human rights, famines, and political and religious oppression. In other words, regarding the two aspects which concern us here, global redistribution is minimal and with a clear cut-off point, 2 and economically-driven migration is not approved. 3 Thus, peoples are basically separated entities.
We shall take Rawls's assumptions as a fair representation of the existing world situation. Indeed, they are. In 2004, aid from rich to poor nations amounted to one-quarter of one percent of rich nation's Gross Domestic Income. 4 At the same time, these nations were spending, on average, more than 30 percent of GDI for domestic social transfers.
Obviously, domestic and foreign poor are not treated equally: one "domestic poor" is worth, on average, about 100,000 "foreign poor (Milanovic, 2006) . Similarly, using an optimal taxation framework, Kopczuk, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2005) , calculate that the implicit weight US policy places on a poor non-citizen is 1/2000 of the implicit weight it assigns to an American poor. Second, in 2002, total migration from poor to rich countries was 2.6 million of people which represented a tiny percentage (less than 1/20 of one percent) of more than 5 billion people living in poor countries. 5 So, both of Rawls' assumptions (or desiderata) seem to hold.
But we shall, for the sake of exposition, modify the Rawlsian metaphor in so much as we shall let the global assembly (i) be the one of all individuals in the world, and not of peoples' representatives, and (ii) not be designed for the individuals to reach a contractarian arrangement. As is customary (from Theory of Justice), individuals meet behind the veil of ignorance. At our original position, each of them is allocated two characteristics that will determine his fate: county and social class within that country. 6 As we have just seen, assignment to a country is "fate" since there is no inter-country movement of people. Assignment to social class can also be seen as "fate" if there is no social mobility within countries. At the other extreme, with perfect social mobility, assignment to social class would not matter as each individual would find, through his own exertion and luck, his merited position in society.
We know that differences between mean country incomes, and differences in income between social classes within countries are large. From the work on global inequality (Milanovic 2002 (Milanovic , 2005 , we also know that about three-quarters of global inequality is due to between-national income differences. Consequently, to what nation one gets allocated is indeed of significant import for own's life chances. By being allocated to a country, the individual receives two "public" goods that are unalterable by his own effort and that are basically fixed during the largest part of his/her life: mean income of the country (relative to the rest of the world) and national level of inequality.
This represents, of course, a somewhat strong assumption. While these parameters are unalterable by any one's individual effort, there are indeed many examples that within one's lifetime the relative position of a country has been transformed, whether by being 5 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/37/34607274.pdf, accessed February 9, 2007. The poor and rich countries are defined here conventionally: the rich as OECD members, the poor as everybody else. 6 If there are N countries, the probability of being assigned a given country is 1/N. In other words, the probability does not depend on country's population. We work here with countries alone, or with Concept 1 (Milanovic 2005) . One could of course envisage a different "lottery" where the probability of being assigned a country would be proportional to its population size, or even to its share of the people born in a given year.
improved, as in the case of China over the last quarter century, or worsened as in the example of Argentina after World War II, or many African and transition countries more recently. Even national inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, which, as Li, Squire and Zou (1998) show, tends to be fairly sluggish, can experience, at times, violent swings. The increases in inequality during the first stage of transition from planned to market economy (including in China), or under the Thatcher-Reagan rule in the UK and the United States, are such examples. For simplicity, however, we shall assume that, for an individual, both mean country income and inequality in his country of assignment are given and unrelated to any effort or desert from his part. They are thus two "morally arbitrary" features allocated to him (see Pogge 1994. p. 197; Nagel 2005, p. 119 ). They will be referred to as "circumstances" (Roemer 1998 ).
Assignment to social class is more ambiguous in its effects than the assignment to a country: on the one hand, assignment to low (or high) social class will determine to a large extent individual's life-time prospects and hence his life-time income. One may (almost) argue that there are no reasons for thinking that being assigned to a top or bottom social class may not be as much a position unalterable in one's life as being assigned to a country. Yet, there is some inter-class social mobility in practically every society with some countries closer to one theoretical end of the spectrum (no social mobility at all) than to the other (full social mobility, viz. irrelevance of social class "assigned" at birth). 7 In that sense, assignment to social class cannot be regarded as much part of "fate" as country assignment in a world with no migration. However, because of existing various levels of social mobility within the countries, country assignment will also determine what extent of social mobility one may hope to achieve. In the rest of the analysis, we shall (at first) assume, rather generously, that most of social movement within country is the result of personal effort and luck. 8 In other words, if we find people in a given social class within their nation, we shall assume that being there (largely) reflects their work effort and luck. It is the second part of Roemer's dichotomy: the "effort."
This issue can be set into more explicitly Roemerian (1998) terms. Suppose that we observe two distributions of outcome (income) that correspond to two unknown distributions of effort ( Figure 1, panel a) . If we believe that the oucomes are strongly influenced by unequal circumstances such as different mean incomes of the two countries, Roemer's definition of equality of opportunity requires that people whose effort, conditional on circumstances, is the same be rewarded equally. 9 Suppose that the two individuals whose effort thus defined is the same (that is, they are at the same percentile, 1-p, of their countries' effort distributions) are A and B. If we adjust for the advantage conferred by higher mean income to A, and still obtain a distribution of income such as shown in panel b, we may conclude that there are other circumstances for which we have failed to adjust. They could be country-specific institutions, policies and norms that limit social mobility or more generally that drive the wedge between the outcomes and individual effort expended,. These additional factors also confer "advantages" to individuals and have to be included under the rubric of "circumstance".
Panel c shows the situation when we have adjusted for all (reasonable) circumstances that may give advantage to one or the other individual (some circumstances may work in favor of one, and others in favor of the other person). To put it more succinctly, circumstance for each type of individual j (where type here is defined by citizenship) that being born poor does not "condemn" one to remain in that class). It is often thought that the US, compared to Europe, exemplifies precisely such a society, even if recent studies (Blanden, Gregg and Machin, 2005) have cast doubt on the superior social mobility in the United States. See also the discussion in Jackson and Segal (2004, p.p. 29-30) . 9 In other words, conditional on circumstance, people at the same percentile of effort should be rewarded the same (or treated equally). Roemer (1998, Chapter 3) distinguishes between relative effort ("degree of effort") and absolute effort ("level of effort"). Relative effort is effort expended compared to what is expected with a given set of circumstances. Equality of opportunity requires that the outcomes be the same for each percentile of the distribution of effort (that is, for each relative effort) allowing thus the same absolute effort to be be rewarded differently.
consists of two parts: µ j and s j where µ j = mean income of country j, and s j = countryspecific part of circumstance in addition to mean income.
10
Having thus set the stage, the questions we want to ask are the follows. How much of one's life chances will be determined by his assignment to a given country vs.
given We shall first (section 2) describe the source of global income distribution data that help us address these questions empirically and review our definitions of country and class. In Section 3, we present some broad regularities regarding the way global income is distributed between countries and social classes. Sections 4 and 5 are the core parts of the paper: they present the analysis that attempts the answers the questions posed above.
The last part gives the conclusions. 
Data and definitions
The data used in the paper come from the World Income Distribution (WYD) database constructed to study the evolution of global inequality. The database is comprised almost entirely of micro data from representative household surveys from most of the countries in the world. For the benchmark year 2002, which is used here, the data come from 123 household surveys representing 120 countries 12 and accounting for 94 percent of world population and 98 percent of world dollar income. 13 The geographical coverage is almost complete for all parts of the world except Africa (see Table 1 ). We now move to some empirical issues showing how the world thus "partitioned" onto countries and social classes really looks. Figure 2 combines the two aspects, of social (within-national) and international (differences in mean countries' incomes) distributions. Income of each ventile is shown in the global distribution. Consider Germany. Since Germany is a rich country, and its income inequality is moderate, most of its population will be highly placed in world income distribution. The poorest German ventile is at the 73 rd percentile of world income distribution. All other ventiles are obviously higher, and the richest ventile belongs to the top world percentile. The same interpretation is for all other countries. We call such curves "the position curves". Unlike Germany, where the span between the richest and the poorest ventile is 27 percentiles, in China, the distribution covers a much wider range from the third to the 85 th percentile. Brazil, with its unequal income distribution, covers practically the entire global spectrum, from the lowest percentiles to the richest. India, in contrast, is shown to be fairly poor with the poorest ventile belonging to the 4 th poorest percentile of the world and the richest ventile to the 70 th . This last position shows that the richest people in India (as a group-admittedly a large one since it contains more than 50 million people) have lower per capita income than the poorest people (as a group) in Germany. In other words, there is no overlap between the two distributions: if we picture the two distributions, with income on the horizontal axis, the Indian income distribution will end before the German distribution starts. This "no overlap" condition is not satisfied for any other two distributions shown here.
Diversity of the world
The graph can also be read as a type of the generalized Lorenz curve where instead of the income level on the vertical axis, we have income position in the world.
The advantage of this "positional" approach is that it reduces the measurement error, 18 but since position is bounded from above these specific generalized Lorenz curves will in many cases be concave rather than (as we are used to) convex. The interpretation however is the same as with generalized Lorenz curves. 19 From Figure 2 we can easily conclude that Sri Lanka's distribution is first-order dominant with respect to India, and that Germany's distribution is first-order dominant compared to any other country 18 Household surveys do not measure income or expenditures perfectly. They are less likely however to make such large mistakes that may result in misplacing of individuals into "wrong" world percentiles.
19 First-order positional dominance must imply first order income dominance. The reverse may not hold because the distribution may be income dominant but the difference in income may be so small as to place a social class from both countries into the same global percentile. 20 Notice that the first-order dominance is a less demanding requirement than the "no overlap" requirement. The latter implies the former. World income distribution can be conventionally broken down into that part of inequality which is due to the differences between mean country incomes, and that part of inequality due to inequality within countries. All studies show that the between inequalities are much more important.
21 Using 2002 data, Table 2 shows the actual global inequality between individuals, and inequality that would have existed if all people in each country had the mean income of their country. As can be observed, depending on the inequality measure, between 66 and 87 percent of global inequality is due to differences in mean incomes. Taking the Gini coefficient, which is the most frequently used measure in global inequality studies, income differences between world citizens 21 See, for example, Milanovic (2002, p.78 and 2005, p. 112) , Sutcliffe (2004) , Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002, p. 734) , Berry and Serieux (2007, p. 84). amount to 65.5 Gini points out of which 55.7 points are due to the between-country component.
22 Table 2 . Global income inequality and the between-country component of it (benchmark year 2002) (1) (2)
Global inequality between individuals
The betweencountry component of global inequality
Share of (2) in (1 
The relative importance of country vs. social class (or effort vs. circumstance)

Predicting global income position based on knowledge of country and class (in the aggregate)
As we have seen, one's position depends on two factors: allocation to a country and allocation to a social class. We can write for i-th individual living in j-th country:
(1) where P ij = income position (percentile) in world distribution, m j = mean country income, G j = national inequality (say, Gini coefficient), and C ij = person's social class in country j and ε ij = the error term..
The results of estimation of (1) are shown in Table 3 . 23 We begin by asking how much of one's global income position is explained by country's mean income alone (regression 1). The answer is 60 percent. Note that each increase of 10 percent in mean country income raises person's position in the world by about 2.3 percentiles. But when individuals are allocated a country, they are not only allocated its mean income but also its inequality level. Including both of them in the regression however does not make much of a difference (regression 2).
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By putting together country and social class (regression 3), we are able to explain more than 90 percent of the variation in people's positions in the global income distribution. As before, each 10 percent increase in mean country income lifts a person, on average, by 2.2 percentage points in the world distribution. Being placed in a higher 23 The regressions are run unweighted implying that each country (regardless of its population) matters equally. This makes sense from the point of view of the original position where, for an individual, the probability of being assigned to any given country is the same. The Rawlsian lottery would be different if probabilities of country assignment were proportional to the population sizes of the countries. It is not an unreasonable assumption but it departs considerably from the Rawlsian metaphor.
24 Each Gini point increase will, on average, lower person's position by about 0.33 percentage points. This, of course, holds only in the aggregate. If we break individuals by social class, then living in a more unequal country (and controlling for mean income) would be advantageous for higher-class individuals. And the reverse for people allocated to low social classes. This point is pursued below.
social class increases one's position by 2.8 percentiles on average. Thus, in the aggregate, belonging to one-notch higher social class is equivalent to residing in a country whose mean income is 12 percent higher. The trade-off between social class, or what we may consider to be a partial reflection of one's effort, and the morally arbitrary placement in a rich county is now clear. If one were, through his effort and luck, to climb eight social classes, he would have "traversed" the road equivalent to being born in a country about twice as rich.
When we break the importance of "circumstance" (country) and "effort" (social class) in explaining one's position in global income distribution, we find that 63 percent is due to the country of residence, and 31 percent to social class. 25 However, social class can be fully treated as "effort" only if we are willing to argue that (1) social class a person is assigned at birth and social class he is in now are totally orthogonal, and that (2) the latter is dependent on his effort (and luck) alone. More formally, we can express that situation as the one where the correlation (ρ) between one's current income and his parents' income is zero. At the other extreme, with no social mobility at all, one's social class at birth determines his current social class (observed in the surveys). In that case, the entire social class variable must be "ascribed" to circumstance.
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The situation in the real world will, of course, differ between the countries and will lie somewhere between the two extremes. Ideally, if we had the data for the correlation of children's and parental income, we could use these country-specific coefficients to model the actual role of social class. Unfortunately, we have such data for only half a dozen, mostly rich, countries. They show that social mobility is relatively high in Nordic European countries and Canada, that it is less in the United States and the UK, and (arguably) even less in the continental Europe (see Solon, 1999 Solon, , pp. 1784 Checci et al. 1999; Bjorklund and Jantti 1997) . The value of ρ ranges from 0.2 in Nordic countries (and in some studies only) to 0.6 There are also some presumptions that in the Third World countries social mobility is less than in the rich world and that it is the least in Africa and Latin America (Lam and Schoeni, 1993) . Based on our survey of the literature, we have incorporated these very tentative results into our "base case" scenario on mobility shown in Table 3 . To see how the results may be sensitive to different mobility assumptions, we introduce also two different cases: optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, where social mobility is respectively greater or less than in the base case scenario. 27 Notice that the regional ranking by social mobility broadly coincides with the rankings according to inequality. Although, of course, the two concepts are different and can move in the opposite directions, it has been suggested that they are unlikely to do so (Davies et al. 2005) . 
where y ij = income (in logs) of i-th individual drawn from a normal distribution, y ij *= income (in logs) of i-th individual's parents (the asterisk denotes parents) and e j = 27 A caveat ought to be made. The correlation numbers we use here to motivate the simulations are mostly derived from correlations of children's and parental earnings (not income as we would ideally like).
the error term drawn from a normal distribution N(0,1). After generating incomes of parents and children, we partition both parents' and children's incomes into twenty ventiles, and for each children's ventile calculate the conditional distribution of "past"
(parents') ventiles. Figure 3 shows such cumulative conditional distributions for the bottom and top ventile when ρ's take values of 0.5 and 0.9. As can be easily seen, with a high ρ, people whom we currently observe in the bottom (top) deciles are very likely to have come from parents who were also in the bottom (top) deciles. But as ρ decreases, that probability lessens. For example, with ρ=0.9, people who are currently in the bottom ventile come with an almost 80 percent probability from the parents who have been located in the bottom five deciles (right panel in Figure 3 ). But with greater social mobility (and a lower ρ=0.5), such probability is just over 60 percent. If eventually ρ were to be 0, the distribution of parents' income (or more accurately, the distribution of parents' ventiles) will be the same for each ventile of children. Table 4 , we show the results for the three scenarios delineated above, the base case, optimistic and pessimistic.
28 That is, the means of the distributions such as shown in Figure 2 .
Comparing regressions (3) and (4), we note that the substitution of own ventile position by parents' ventile position leaves broadly unchanged the total "explained" variability of income position in the world. Parents' social class is not only statistically significant but in the absolute value greater than own social class: on average, having parents' ventile position go up by one notch increases one's position in the world by 6.3
percentage points. The reason why the coefficient on parents' social position is larger than on own position is easily explained if we consider that the effect of a positive ρ is that it "shrinks" the distribution of parents' ventiles compared to the current (observed) distribution. 29 In conditions of social mobility, however slight, people currently in the bottom social class have parents whose estimated social class is higher than the bottom (for otherwise there would be no mobility); people in the top social class, would likewise have parents whose expected social position is closer to the middle etc. This is illustrated in Figure 4 on the example of Germany. The "shrinkage" of parents' expected social class compared to the children's' produces a steeper line, as shown by the broken line in Figure 4 , and thus each one-point increase in parents' social class will have a greater absolute effect on one's position in the world than one own similar one-step increase.
Notice that in the extreme example of almost full mobility (with ρ→0), the broken line in Figure 4 would tend to become a straight vertical line starting at x=10, and then even the slightest increase in parents' social class would have dramatic (positive) impact on one's own position in world income distribution. 29 Only if ρ were negative, would it lead to the "widening" of the spread of parents' (compared to children's) social class. On the contrary, every ρ>0 shrinks the distribution. The importance of circumstance decreases noticeably however in the optimistic scenario (see regression 5 in Table 4 ) when we assume relatively high (although uneven) social mobility in all parts of the world. Circumstances (country of citizenship and parents' social class) explain now 72 percent of total variability in income position. With a pessimistic scenario of very low social mobility, the role of circumstances increases to 94 percent again (regression 6 in Table 4 ).
In conclusion, between 60 and more than 90 percent of variability in global Let us now compare this actual role of location to a hypothetical situation where all countries' mean incomes are equal. 30 We still "allocate" people to different countries and social classes in our Rawlsian lottery, but now location implies only a difference in income distributions between the countries (different Ginis), not the difference in average wealth. The results are shown in column (7). The coefficient on social class more than doubles compared to regression (3), and when we decompose the two effects, social class is found to explain more than 90 percent of variability in global income position, while location (through its specific inequality) accounts for less than 5 percent. 31 The counterfactual allows us to conclude that location really matters through its mean income effect, not through its specific (national) inequality.
Median global position and its variability when social class is given
After this flight of fancy, let us return to the world as it is. A different way to look at effort is to consider by how much one's position in the world improves if he or she is able to move up the ladder within his/her country. For example, for a person in the bottom social class, the median position in the world is the 7 th percentile. Suppose now that he manages to climb up to the 5 th social class. His median position will have improved to the 39 th percentile. Another equivalent climb of five social classes up the ladder will place him in the 56 th percentile. So far we have considered only the median position of a person if his national social class is given. What is important to take into account also is that the variability of one's position in world income distribution is not the same regardless of social class. In other words, the distribution of positions for various social classes is different. Figure 6 illustrates this for the two extremes, the top and bottom social classes. The distributions are of different shapes, in addition to covering obviously different parts of the global income distribution. The overlap between the two distributions is small but the very fact that it exists illustrates how unequal national mean incomes must be because in some A slightly different, and a more complete, way to look at this is shown in Figure   7 . There we plot percentile ranks in the global income distribution for each social class against mean country income. The upward sloping curves show that, for any given social class, the increase in mean country income is associated with higher position of that social class in the global income distribution. The relationship is sharper as we move from low to high social classes. This means that the variability of outcomes, due to national idiosyncratic factors, will be greater among the nationally poor than among the nationally rich. In effect, the variability of positional outcomes, measured by the standard deviation, steadily decreases (with one exception) as social class goes up (see Figure 8 ).
For low social classes (below the fifth), the standard deviation is about 30 percentiles; for the top social classes, the standard deviation is less than 20 percentiles. A significant exception to this regularity is the lowest social class whose variability of position is less than that of the second, third and the few following classes.
To summarize: if one is in the top social class of his country, the median position in the world that he can expect to attain is the 92 nd percentile and the standard deviation is only about 12 percentiles. If he belongs to the bottom social class in his country, his median position in the world is the 7 th percentile but the standard deviation is much larger: about 26 percentiles. In other words, for those who belong to low social classes ("nationally poor"), location matters even more than to those who are "nationally rich".
To this issue we turn next. 
Varying importance of location for different social classes
If social class is given, how well can we predict global position with knowledge of country income alone?
When people are allocated a social class in our Rawlsian lottery, it is not a matter of indifference, as we have seen, what country they get allocated to. Location, if one "draws" a rich country, can more than compensate for a "wrong" social class. But the impact of location is not uniform at all social class levels. When a person is allocated a country, he is also allocated two relevant features of that country: its mean income, and its income distribution. Table 5 shows the results of regressions similar to (1) but with social class being held constant. That is, for each social class, we regress person's position in world income distribution on country's characteristics alone, its mean income and a measure of its inequality (the ventile's share of total income). These two characteristics always explain more than 90 percent of variability in person's position (with social class given). For example, looking at the people in the lowest social class, the R 2 is about 0.9, and each 10 percent increase in mean country income is worth 2.3 percentiles climb in the global income distribution. But for a person belonging to the top social class, each 10 percent increase in mean country income is worth only 1.2 percentiles increase in the global income distribution. We find again that location matters more to nationally poor than to nationally rich people.
Trade-off between country's mean income and country's distribution across social classes
The two country characteristics (mean income and its inequality, expressed as a ventile share) can also be seen as substitutes: given his social class, a person might prefer to be "allocated" into a more equal society even if its mean income is less. He could benefit more (if he is poor) by the first than lose by the second. Intuitively, we can also see that if a person is allocated to a top income class, then the gain from belonging to a more equal society will be negative. Thus, the trade-off between mean income and inequality is not the same across social classes. Going back to our example of the bottom social class, we see that each point increase in the bottom group's ventile share is worth a (huge) climb of 23 percentage points in world income position (see regression 1 in Table   5 ). Now, to achieve the same increase of 23 points in the global position, a person would need to be located in a country twice as rich. This is the shape of the trade-off for those in the lowest social class. Contrast this with the fact that if the ventile share of the people in the richest social class goes up by 1 percentage point their position in the world will improve by only 0.6 percentile which is an increase equivalent to living in a country that is only 5 percent richer (regression 20 in Table 5 ). -186.3 -197.2 -197.3 -194.0 -189.2 -184.2 -177 -170.7 -163.3 -155.6 -147.9 -140.2 -132.7 -122.1 -112.5 -106.4 -100.8 -91.3 -62.4 -17.9 (0) 
Constant
Note: Ventile share expressed in percent of total country income. Mean per capita income in $PPP per annum. p-values between brackets However, the reasonable trade-off has to allow that the increase of 1 percentage point in the ventile share is in relative terms much greater (and much less likely to obtain) for the poor people than for the top income class. For the poor, such an increase would mean a doubling of their share, for the richest, an increase of less than 1/20 (see Table 6 ). To normalize for this and make the analysis more realistic, we consider a tradeoff where a person is, in each case (that is, given the social class he or she belongs), placed in a country whose ventile share is one standard deviation above the average. This means that for the poorest social group, his positional gain would be 0.52 percentage points, for the richest group 7.35 points (see Table 6 ). Now, the relative "worth" of national income distribution thus defined is contrasted to the "worth" of higher mean country income. The results are shown in Figure 9 . The importance of national distribution is, as expected, very high for the poor: "getting" a country whose bottom class's share is one standard deviation above the mean is equivalent to "drawing" a country that is 50 percent richer. The trade-off then gradually weakens before picking up for the richest three social groups. There too "drawing" a (very unequal) country such that, for example, the highest social class has a ventile share that is one standard deviation higher than the mean ventile share of that social class, is equivalent to living in a 40 percent richer country. We therefore have to modify our earlier conclusion: for both the people who are "assigned" to be nationally poor and nationally rich, "drawing" respectively more equal or more unequal country will matter a lot. The results have implications for migration. If low social class people migrate to richer countries, and expect that they would end up there too among low social classes, then equality of the receiving country's income distribution must be quite important for them. A very large increase indeed in mean country income is needed to offset this "distributional premium". But differently, if nationally rich people (say, highly skilled) migrate from a poor to a rich country, and expect to be among high income groups in their new country too, then they might prefer to select highly unequal societies, even if their mean income is less than the mean income of an alternative migration destination.
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Given mean income of the recipient country, and given expectations on where one might be placed in the social structure of the new country, we would expect lowskilled people to migrate into more equal countries and more skilled people to migrate into more unequal countries. This parallels the idea underlying Borjas's (1987 Borjas's ( , 1999 self-selection hypothesis. However, note that the picture here is a bit more complex, in the sense that while the increase in mean income has to be high at both ends of income distribution to compensate for either unequal income distribution (for the poor) or equal income distribution (for the rich), the offsetting increase in mean country income is rather minimal for middle income groups (see, for examples, ventiles 11 through 18 in Figure   9 ). It means that for the middle classes, the distribution in the receiving country will not matter much: country's mean income will be much more important. 34 In turn, this result implies that for most people with moderate skill levels, or with people with high skill levels who do not expect to be able to make it to the top of the income ladder in the receiving country, it will be mean income of the receiving country that would trump other considerations. 34 The finding parallel Palma's (2006) recent emphasis on broad share constancy of middle deciles regardless of how equal or unequal the overall distribution is. In other words, inequality of distributions is determined by high or low shares of the top or bottom fractiles, not by the shares of the middle groups. 
Conclusions
This paper allows us to make three key conclusions.
First, with only two characteristics, person's location (which in a world with no significant migration, essentially means his place of birth), and social class (which also could be determined by birth), we are able to account for more than 90 percent of his/her position in global income distribution. The first characteristic (location) is clearly a "circumstance", or a morally inconsequential, feature. It explains 60 percent of one's position in global income distribution. The second characteristic, to the extent that social mobility is not absolute, also has a share of "circumstance" rather than "effort" in it. We estimate that between 1/3 and 2/3 of the social class effect is due to circumstance.
Recalling other obvious circumstances (like gender) which are not included in the analysis, it is very unlikely than more than 1/5 th of one's position in global income distribution can be ascribed to one's effort. Global equality of opportunity is rather minimal; perhaps, a distant dream.
Second, this ability to "predict" very well one's location in global income distribution from only two characteristics, holds, not only in the aggregate, but for each social class separately. Thus, for any given social class, the knowledge of the country where a person lives is sufficient to "explain" 90 percent or more of that person's global income position. The predictive power of country mean income is strong, not only in the aggregate, but for each social class. Living in a richer country is particularly important for low social classes, where each 10 percent increase in country's mean income, lifts person's global income rank by 2.3 percentiles on average. The "location premium" is significant but less for the top income groups where it amounts to between 1 and 1.5
percentiles. In other words, the "average worth" of living in a richer country is shown to hold for the entire national income distributions, but to be particularly strong for the "nationally" poor.
Third, given a person' social class, there is also the trade-off between wealth of the country (reflected in its mean income) and its income distribution. Thus, a person who is allocated a low social class might prefer to be allocated to a more egalitarian country even if that country's mean income is less. The opposite, of course, holds for a person allocated to a high social class: he might benefit from country's inegalitarian distribution more than from its high mean income. The trade-off is such that being placed in a country that is one standard deviation more egalitarian than the average is equivalent, for a person belonging to the lowest social class, to living in a 50 percent richer country. For a person who belongs to the highest social class, getting a one standard deviation more inegalitarian country is equivalent to living in a 40 percent richer country. But these sharp trade-offs between internal income distribution of a country and its mean income hold mostly for the extreme social classes. For the middle classes, distribution is relatively unimportant-mostly because income shares of these middle groups do not vary much across nations. Thus, for the middle ventiles, "drawing" a one standard deviation more egalitarian country can be compensated by a small increase in mean country income of less than 10 percent (or even less than 5 percent in some cases). Consequently, for the people in the middle, wealth of the country, measured by its mean income, will be of paramount importance.
The last point has clear implications for migration. If people who migrate expect to be placed in the middle of the national income distribution of the receiving country, they will be focused primarily on country's mean income. But if people who migrate expect to end up in the bottom of the recipient country's income distribution, whether the recipient country is egalitarian will be of significant importance in their decision-making.
And the reverse if they expect to end up in the top of income distribution of the recipient country.
ANNEX: Some country comparisons
Spans between the highest and lowest social classes Table A1 shows although all its citizens, including the poorest, would be positioned highly in global income distribution. The span would be small even if inequality is high. 35 The first measure, shown in column (3) of Table A1 , represents the average position of all people in a country (thus each individual is weighted equally). The second measure, shown in column (4), is the position in world income distribution of a person with the mean income of the country. Since income distributions are skewed to the right, the second value will be always higher. Figure 36 United States is more unequal than the UK but the position span (38 points) is less than in the United Kingdom.
Great class differences in the UK
China urban vs. India urban
As Figure A2 shows, China's urban population is better off throughout the entire income distribution spectrum than the urban population in India (positional first order dominance holds).
37 However while the difference is very large for the middle ventiles, it is less for the bottom and even less for the highest ventiles. The highest Chinese urban ventile's has an income that places it at the 89 th percentile; for India, the equivalent Figure A3 exhibits the position curves for urban and rural India. The difference between the two, for a given ventile, increases as we move from poor toward rich ventiles. The difference is small at the bottom of income distribution with the bottom rural ventile belonging to the 3 rd lowest percentile in the world, and the poorest urban ventile to the 9 th percentile. 
Rural India vs. urban India
Russia vs. urban China
Russia and urban China display very similar distributions, both in terms of the overall positional span as well as in terms of the positions of different ventiles (see Figure   6A ). 38 It is noticeable that the poor in urban China are slightly better off than the poor in Russia. The top 40 percent of income distribution are practically undistinguishable.
Brazil is shown in the graph to provide a counter-point. The poor, and large segments of the lower middle class are much worse off in Brazil than in the other two countries, but the upper middle classes and top of the Brazilian income distribution are markedly richer. 
